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my
it

am

that /

came
it

remember how, for the

to

first

time,

In a flash of insight

personahty.

here?"

I

I

remember almost the

me, a boy of perhaps nine years, on

led to nothing

and unique

more than wonder, and

in the

became conscious of

I

asked myself,
spot

where

my way

"How

is

this idea

But

to school.

a feeling of standing alone

world of my experience, and with the conviction
must experience the consciousness of a

that every other person

and

like isolation

Only many years

liniquity.

later did I

concern

myself with the meaning of self-consciousness and with the efforts

But now, for many years, I have
it.
had the problem, in one aspect or another, in my thoughts, and it
has gathered from associated problems so many suggestions, that
I have come to regard it and them as parts of an intelligible scheme
of psychologists to explain

of things.

One
in

of the fruits of

my memory

my

college course in Logic

was the storage

of certain significant phrases or catchwords, such

as "begging the question," "arguing in a circle," etc.

known

as

Occam's razor, neatly expressed

We

lished thus

:

ment

we

that

part in

those

One of these,
may be Eng-

ought not to introduce into our reasoning any eleThe maxim has played an important

don't need.

modern psychology.

who do

in Latin,

It

is

psychology without a psyche,

i.

e.,

by

the cause of the complaint,

not appreciate the methods of that science that

without a soul.

In fact,

it

it

is

can

get along very well without postulating a soul, better, indeed, than

can optics, thermo-dynamics, electro-dynamics, without postulating
light,

heat and electricity

;

for these latter designate forces that enter

problems with which those branches of
Soul, however, represents no concept that affords

in calculable fashions into the

science

deal.
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any assistance in dealing with the problems of the mind's operations.
As William James says. Psychology, \q\. I, p. 182. "We must ask
ourselves whether after all, the ascertainment of a blank unmediated
correspondence, term for term, of the succession of states of con-

—

sciousness with the succession of total brain processes

word of

simplest psycho-physic formula, and the last

be not the

:

a psychology

which contents itself with verifiable laws, and seeks only to be clear,
and to avoid unsafe hypotheses." And he decides "to take no
account of the soul" in his book.

Even

word mind

the

is

too vague a term to convey any definite

meaning, or perhaps too likely to carry with

it

misleading implica-

"Cerebral activity" or "cerebration" are harmless, and con-

tions.

venient because sufficiently vague.

Mind

is

generally taken to imply consciousness or the possibility

"Presence of mind," "I have

of consciousness.
in

But cerebral

mind." are examples.

mental processes of which ordinarily

we never become

ber of which

become
able

so,

and some

Examples of the

we

are conscious, a vast

num-

some of which we

rarely

conscious,

from our most vividly conscious

first class

activities.

are the processes that control and regu-

our various organs,

late the functions of

it

without being conscious are indistinguish-

that,

their results

in

mind," "bear

in

activity includes, besides the

blood, the digestive activities,

etc.,

e. g.,

the circulation of the

of the second, the

efiforts

that

maintain our erect posture and direct our ordinary movements, as

by

well as those that,

we

Of

say.

eral

all

way, are

marked

these

still

so,

dint of practice, have

efiforts

we were once

become automatic,

as

conscious, and in a gen-

but not to the degree or

in the

manner

that

their first exercise.

Of the third class are
know of none that is not

all

capable, in

some persons,

at

being carried on without a trace of consciousness,

Occam's razor commands us

we

conscious activities whatever, since

to eliminate this class,

some

e.

g.,

time, of
in sleep.

and thus

dis-

miss consciousness, as an element of no importance in mental activities

and of no use

in efifecting their classification.

But the

late

Wil-

liam James has strongly expressed himself in favor of the opposite
view.

"The

particulars of

animal kingdom]
p. 138,

"so far as

Ih\d., p. 134,

action

"A

shows that

the distribution

[among members of the

of consciousness." he says. Psychology, \o\.

we know them,

point to

its

priori analysis of both brain action
if

the latter were efficacious,

I,

being efficacious." and

it

and conscious

would, bv

its

selec-
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emphasis make amends for the indeterminateness of the former, whilst the study a posteriori of the distribution of conscioustive

ness shows

we might

expect from an organ
But he afterwards says,
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 589, "From the guessing of newspaper enigmas to
the plotting of the policy of an empire, there is no other process
to

it

be exactly such as

grown too complex

than

We

this.

regulate itself."

to

trust the laws of cerebral nature to present us spon-

taneously with the appropriate idea."

But

in that case,

what

is

And how

ness to regulate?

there left for an "organ" of consciousis

it

possible to trust "a system

grown

too complex to regulate itself" to "present us spontaneously with
the appropriate idea"?

Again, when there flashes into the mind the

solution of a problem long consciously, but vainly, sought,

what

common knowledge
that such complicated cerebral activities may go on while we are
unconscious of them, perhaps in sleep, or while we are awake and
organ has regulated the brain?

It

has become

are conscious of occurrences and thoughts quite alien to those activities.

Our

After

all,

our daily

carried on in exactly this fashion.

life is

cerebral system seems to be arranged in departmental fashion,

each department attending to

from the

Being

others.

own work

its

same

in tjie

without interference

building, as

it

were, there

is

often awareness of one on the part of another of them, or even

communication between them.
Xow as to the emphasis supposed by James to be given by consciousness. Emphasis is always present, and we are often conscious
of it. But it does not always help, and sometimes it interferes. For
example, when

we

experience,

undue emphasis

if

name or other datum of past
thrown upon a supposedly sig-

are trying to recall a
is

nificant circumstance or element,

it

may

prevent the free search of

mind in other directions and retard its arrival at the desired
result.
Even as James says, "we trust our cerebral nature," if we

the

are wise, "to present us spontaneously with the appropriate idea."

But

an "organ" of consciousness that lays the emphasis on

is it

this or that in

tem
fact.

Why

To me it seems that the cerebral sysand consciousness is our awareness of the

our thoughts?

lays the emphasis,
this

should be so

is

the mystery.

Why,

for example,

without any conceivable stimulus from the outside world, and at a
juncture of time quite without significance, as far as

should the idea of

my

personality have

emerged

ness, as described at the beginning of this

be conscious,

now

paper?

in

I

can discover,

my

Why

conscious-

should

we

of the most trivial ideas in our stream of thought
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and perhaps unconscious of the most important and far-reaching
ideas, or again, conscious only of these last?

It is

true that trivial

things sometimes stimulate cerebral activity out of

all

proportion

and that far-reaching experiences are often not appreciated at the time and produce their impressions only slowly and by
combination with other elements. But all that goes on, for the most
part, in our subconscious or unconscious selves, although, from
time to time, parts of the process may emerge into consciousness.
But let me cite a few other passages from Mr. James from the
same chapter as the foregoing, that on the Automaton Theory.
"Common-sense has the root and gist of the truth in her hands when
she obstinately holds to it that feelings and ideas are causes and
so are furtherances and checkings of internal cerebral motions of
which in themselves we are entirely without knowledge."
"Whatever our ideas of causal efficacy may be, we are less wide
of the mark when we say our ideas and feelings have it than the
to themselves

—

automatists are

"The

motions [ideas,
in

when they say they

haven't

it."

[brain] will be for us a sort of vat in which feelings
I

should say]

which innumerable things

and

somehow go on stewing together and
happen of which we catch but the

statistical result."

"The feelings can produce nothing new, they can only reinforce
and inhibit reflex currents w^hich already exist."

Now we know
may

that the reflex action following certain stimuli

we are unconscious of any feeling, such
under other circumstances the same stimuli produce in us.
To go back to a passage above quoted. I would say that feelings
and ideas are furtherances and checkings, nay are the very motive
forces of all action.
By ideas I would understand every result of
a reaction of the cerebro-spinal system to a stimulus, beyond the
bare feeling aroused, whether the stimulus be from the external
world or from the organism itself, as well as all developments of
such results, by their reaction upon each other, meaning to divide
the activities of the neural substance awakened by stimuli into
feelings and ideas, sometimes distinct from each other sometimes
closely associated.
Both would seem to be results of impressions,
ideas however to be definite records of facts in experience, while
occur so quickly that

as

feelings are

excitements of a pleasureable or painful or neutral

character, by the experiences or by
that

if

memories of them.

It is

obvious

an idea embodies facts that excited painful sensations the

stimulus that would arouse that idea to activity would

awaken

to
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some extent those painful

had become so

feelings, unless the idea

modified by other ideas that

it

has lost the elements of the original

In fact, all of our
and pain except the comparatively few derived
from bodily sensations, are due to ideas. And these ideas may have
gained their power of thus affecting our feelings by very slight,
often by vicarious reference to experience, as when a mere recital
of tragical events, not one of whose elements of horror ever came
within our experience, may arouse in us a lively perturbation of
mind. Is it not plain that those ideas and feelings of which we are
conscious arise from causes of whose existence we should be aware
only from this consciousness? Who can tell why an idea that in
one person arouses a certain feeling, arouses in another person a
very different feeling? Sometimes, it is true, the history of the
individual, as known to others or to himself affords an explanation
of the phenomenon, but oftener its cause is lost in the void of for-

experience that produced the painful feelings.
feelings of pleasure

gotten experiences.

may become

Again, the idea associated with a feeling
mutilated to insignificance, while the feeling

is

lost

or

ever ready to respond

as a reaction to the sort of stimulus that first aroused

The elementary phenomena seem to be these,

i.

it.

e.,

feelings or

They lead to the
same momentary environment

emotions are primarily the results of sensations.
creature's efforts to continue in the

or to escape from

it,

according as the feeling

weak

is

pleasant or the

provoke action.
There are always a greater or less number of sensations associated
with the one that stands out as determining the feeling. The perceptions that arise from the whole group of sensations get tied
together by mere simultaneity of origin as do the various concepts
resulting from them, any one of which may then be sufficient, when
later entering the mind, to call up one or all of the rest, or without
so doing, so far as consciousness is aware, may awaken the associreverse, or perhaps the sensations are too

to

ated feelings.
"If

we

start,"

says James, "from the frog's spinal cord and

reason by continuity saying, as that acts so intelligently, though
unconscious, so the higher centers, though conscious
intelligence they
diately

starting

show

quite as mechanically based

;

may have the
we are imme-

met by the exact counter argument from continuity,"

from the hemispheres, "as these owe

the consciousness which

we know

i.

e.,

their intelligence to

to be there, so the intelligence of

THE
the spinal cord's acts

must be due

ence there of a consciousness lower

The
i.

e.,

error here

lies in

that consciousness
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to the invisible
in

[unfelt?] pres-

degree."

assuming the very thing

to be determined,

a cause of intelligence.

"All arguments from continuity," continues James, "work in
two ways you can either level up or level down by their means.
And it is clear that such arguments as these can eat each other up
:

to all eternity."

Why

not accept the truth of both arguments, and reconcile their

apparent inconsistency by avoiding the quite gratuitous assumption

any causal

that consciousness has

efficacy

The

whatever?

facts

then appear to be that the various parts of the nervous system are
capable of intelligent action in their several spheres of influence

and that

in the

adjective

and

is

hemispheres

The

sciousness.

this action

action need not, in

case,

besides misleading.

It is

know

not

how any

indeed, Avhat thought

is,

know and what may be

we

enough

to say "reflex,"

sense,

meaning

find to affect nervous organisms.

brain activity gives rise to thought, or,

but

false,

we need
i.

e.,

not assume what

we do

is an agent in bringing about such an activity.
do know that our brains are stimulated and this because of the

we

experience.

not

that our consciousness of an idea

or of a thought

ings that

con-

be stigmatized by the

"mechanical," which has acquired a derogatory

responsive to stimuli such as

We

may be accompanied by

any

Conscious of these,

we may

at the

We
feel-

same

time become conscious of some idea that has become associated

with such feelings by former experiences.

For we know

that the

reaction of our nerv^ous system to stimuli takes place quite inde-

may accompany them.
But may not the ideas have the power to reverse the process, as
a phonograph reproduces the sounds that made its "records"? May
not the ideas awaken the sensations and feelings that produced them,
or were at least intimately associated with them?
Nay may not
ideas become the sources of emotions of a kind that tend to produce
such ideas? It would seem so. The action and reaction of the
elements of our mental life is so intricate and so rapid that it would
seem to be impossible to determine the initial element in any group
of activities. When we are in a quiescent mood, innumerable ideas
flit into our stream of thought, whether we are awake or asleep.
Perhaps one of these is that of a duty to be fulfilled, and we seek to
fulfill it, or of a pleasure to be obtained and we set about securing it.
But the ideas may enter yet give rise to no tendency to realize them
pendently of any ideas that
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in action.

action.

It

would seem as

And

again,

it

if,

after

may happen

all,

impulses must be sources of

that before

we can obey

the call

to action that seems to be aroused by an idea, our tendency to do
so is inhibited by an emotion that may not, at least at first, be accom-

panied by any conscious idea. Here, however, we seem to be thrown
back upon some subconscious idea, awakened by association with
that in evidence,

which gives

rise to the inhibitory impulse.

If the

opposing impulses be nearly equal in strength, the struggle between
them is likely to awaken an abundance of ideas. But I should say
that the contest

And many

is

not between the ideas, but between the impulses.

such take place without revealing to consciousness the

We even experience lively
which no reasoning, i. e., no ideas
consciously therewith associated, seems to have any power to settle.
We do not know which course to pursue and simply await the issue
It is in prolonged struggles of this kind that we
of the conflict.
ideas with which they are associated.
vacillation in regard to conduct

become conscious of many
cerned.

It is

much

as

if

ideas associated with each impulse con-

either side tried to

every notion that experience furnished, yet,

draw

to

its

assistance

when

all

is

done, one

of the impulses prevails, in spite of the plausible array of ideas

Indeed the sudits own ideas of which we are conscious.
den advent of a new impulse may cut the gordian knot of the conflicting impulses and decide our action, without awakening the ghost
of an idea. We stand like the spectators of a combat between two
nearly submerged monsters of the deep, seeing from time to time
exposed to view a fin, a tail, a head, a back, a side, a belly, but never
opposing

an organ or part whose condition of wholeness or hurt might give
indication of how the fight is progressing.
Where we are conscious of a struggle of contending impulses,
we seldom know what particular stimuli called them into action,
even though we recognize them as familiar elements in our personality, unless we can refer them, or one or more of them, to the influence of some object or idea of which we have presently become
aware. And we never feel sure, after a decision of one of our men-

some

due to the impulse whose associated ideas are
most vivid in our consciousness at that moment. We know that any
decision would draw to itself its kindred notions, i. e., clothe itself
We also know that we are often conin becoming considerations.

tal conflicts, that it is

scious of an effort to obscure the real impulse that led to the decision,

by

filling

the thoughts with other considerations that

plausible reasons for

it.

And we

are fully aware that this

seem
efifort
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obeys an impulse from below consciousness, quite involuntary,
fact.

"Consciousness," says James, "is at

Whether we take

ing agency.

we

the highest of intellection,

it

in the

find

it

in

times primarily a select-

all

lowest sphere of sense or in

always doing one thing, choos-

ing one out of several of the materials so presented to its notice,
emphasizing and accentuating that and suppressing as far as possible
all

the rest."

For this phraseolog}^ I venture to substitute the following, as
more accurately descriptive of what takes place.
There is within us at all times a selective power. Whether the
matter to be dealt with
highest of intellection,

in the

is

we

lowest sphere of sense or in the

find this

power or regulator doing one
more materials so presented

thing, choosing one out of several or
to its notice, etc.

In short, "the activity of consciousness"

is

cation in expression of the single fact that

an

illusion,

we

or a dupli-

are conscious of

activity.

We

can trace something similar to this consciousness in the lower

animals, and must regard

them

as probably conscious of

some

part

of the intelligent action which goes on in their organisms, though

language

is

Indeed
in

mind

Is

it

lacking
is

in the

them

to express their state of

passage

last

not "intelligence" that

name of consciousness?
always doing one thing, etc., and only

quoted, under the
is

gradually developing consciousness,

going on

mind.

not this intelligent action precisely what James had

in the

i.

e.,

awareness of the

activities

neural substance?

Animals show character, personality, habits, good and bad, and
They dream, they have their likes

are susceptible of being trained.

and

dislikes, of

persons or of other animals, even of their

own

kind,

and their griefs.
Most of us. on reflection, are conscious in regard to our recent
activities that they were quite free from any consciousness of ourselves.
They went on automatically or with moderate attention to
surrounding circumstances, attention of which we were unconscious.
Indeed, we often carry on simultaneously, two or more lines of
activity, like walking and talking, and may pay so little attention to

their affections

either as to

remember even immediately afterwards very

little

con-

Yet each had been efficiently directed by our organism.
No problem, however intricate, no mental creation, of music, of
literature or of other construction, however elaborate, but has depended substantially as James, in eff'ect, declares, upon unconscious
cerning

it.

—
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Our

cerebral action.

consciousness furnishes neither guidance nor

material for this action, but

simply awareness of

is

to a limited extent of the interplay of the impulses

and,

its results,

from which they

spring.

One of James's arguments for the efficacy of consciousness is
based on a conception of the brain as an organ of highly uncertain
equilibrium, likely to function at haphazard upon the slightest impulse, a "hair-trigger organization,"

from which one cannot "reason-

ably expect any certain pursuance of useful lines of reaction, such
as the

few and

constitute

fatally

determined performances of the lower centers

within their narrow sphere."

[sic]

And, "The perform-

ances of a high brain are like dice thrown forever on a table. Unless
they are loaded, what chance

is

there that the highest

number

will

turn up oftener than the lowest?"

And

he asks whether conscience can load the dice, that

is

bring

pressure to bear in favor of the most permanent interests of the

He says that is what consciousness seems to do. He
undoubtedly right when he says, "Consciousness is only intense

brain's owner.
is

when

nerve-processes are hesitant.

consciousness

is

But speaking,

power

indecision

to decide, but

am

when

not only

conscious that

I

am
am

I

great

Besides,

it

is

not conscious

at the

the forces that are deciding, or trying, to decide, and
their decision.

is

as always in this paper, for myself, these times of

intense consciousness are times

of any

Where

agonizingly intense."

am

mercy of
awaiting

very evident that the brain decides,

and rightly decides, many matters that surely do not come within
the narrow sphere of the lower centers, since they require more
than mere reflex action to the customary stimuli, yet it does not
trouble consciousness with such matters. Which means merely that
numerous actions that have to be learned end by becoming automatic, so to speak, even though requiring intellectual guidance, e. g.,
speaking, writing, reading.

In such activities

we

are usually quite

unconscious of the directive efforts that secure appropriate performance and only infer them from the results. Our desires seem directly
realized without more conscious effort than in walking. Consciousness of effort

is

not the same as effort of consciousness, as Mr.

James would argue

it is.

Mr. James finds a guiding function in consciousness in cases
where the functions of missing parts of the brain are taken up by
the parts that remain.
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function

in

fundamentally identical

obedience to the demands of the organism be the law of
development, there seems to be no difficulty in supposing this

tissues, in
its

law to be manifested in the part of the brain that survives the inThis would require no different control or direction from
that under which the organism originally acquired its powers, and
jury.

Mr. James does not assert that this was by means of consciousness.
Let us examine some of the manifestations of consciousness.
When we undertake to learn any set of movements, like those of
a dance, of the fingers in playing on a musical instrument, or of the
organs of speech for pronouncing a foreign language, we are conscious of efforts to bring about certain definite results.

cases

we do

not succeed in our

first

attempt.

We

In most
proceed by suc-

and these are conducted by a process of which we are
A striking example of this process is
afforded by learning to ride on a bicycle, which is quite comparable
to the efforts of a child in learning to stand and to walk. We simply
cessive trials,

but imperfectly conscious.

keep trying, that

is,

we

persist in offering to our subconscious selves

the opportunity to adjust our muscles so as to maintain the balance

of our bodies and of the wheel.

ever secured from discovery, since
ness.

When

How
it

this is accomplished is fornever emerges into conscious-

practice has enabled us to ride with ease,

far lost consciousness of even the tentative

panied our learning, that

They have been

we

could not,

if

we

movements

we have
that

so

accom-

would, reproduce them.

beyond possibility of conscious recall, merged
in the completed fashion of movement.
So, we may presume, were
developed the necessary movements of the earliest living organisms,
by efforts to maintain their existence, and in like manner these once
become habitual, the steps by which they were formed lapsed into
lost

Hence we are normally unconscious of the processes concerned in the digestion of our food, of our respiration, of the circulation of our blood, etc.
When we do become conscious of such
oblivion.

we know that we are victims of some malady or at least
some disturbance of our ordinary balance of bodily functions.
Thus pain or discomfort becomes a warning of trouble that must be
met by appropriate action.
But let us take a case in which consciousness is extremely alive,
and which, according to James's idea, as expressed in several of the
operations,

of

above quotations, ought to exhibit the guidance and selective emphasis of that "organ." so desirable for the accomplishment of the purpose in hand. Take an intricate problem in mathematics. What
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emphasis or guidance are
give or are

we

we

conscious of being able consciously to

We are aware of holding the
knowledge within which we suppose

conscious of giving?

attention to certain regions of

the elements will be found that should lead to the solution.
this,

we may be

result, but of

The study

no

details of the activity aroused.

of consciousness seems to call for a consideration not

of the kinds of idea that
is

Beyond

conscious of strong efforts to evolve the desired

may

figure in

it,

for

we know

of none that

not capable of sometimes being there present, except those con-

cerned with purely physical functions, but rather of the circumstances under which ideas in general are extruded, as it were, from

Under an external stimulus,
perform actions when the stimulus is too weak

the unconscious into our awareness.

we may

be induced to

to attract our attention.

And

these actions

may

themselves

fail

our attention from the subject of our thought. A familiar
is our avoidance, while walking in deep reflection,
of small obstacles or unclean footing in our pathway. On a more
extensive scale, the same relation of cause and effect may be seen in
to divert

instance of this

the

movements of

a somnambulist.

may

But

at its

extreme development,

emphaand ideas so different from those usually in
control as to constitute a new personality unknown to the normal
There may be several such personalities successively maniself.
fested, in the same individual, more or less unknown to each other,
but totally unknown to the normal self.
The late William Morris, in his Neivs from Nowhere, has not
belied psychological truth, in making his tale an example of a dream
so vivid that the dreamer seems to himself to be awake but in a different world from that in which his life has been passed.
this sort of consciousness

indicate that the organism has

sized a set of impulses

I myself have experienced, in brief form, this sort of dream,
accompanied by a skeptical opinion of its reality. Some mystics
have maintained that our ordinary life is but a dream, from which,

we shall awake in the real world.
would suggest a rude scale of degrees of awareness, placing at
the bottom awareness of conditions of the environment and their
relation to the prime needs of the organism, whose intelligence develops by "trial and error," the capacity to utilize these for its purposes. Next above this degree would come that in which the organism is capable of valuating alternatives and choosing the one best
at death,
I

interests. Here, perhaps, may be placed the beginning
impulses, which awaken consciousness.
between
of struggles

suited to

its
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But Mr. James adduces pleasures, which are normal to most benexperiences, and displeasures or pains, which are concomitants of most detrimental influences, as showing the causal efficacy
of consciousness. It is true he says that Spencer and others have
suggested that this is due to natural selection, since that would weed
eficial

organisms that enjoyed fundamentally noxious experiences.
"But," says James, "if pleasures and pains have no efficacy, one does
not see (without some such a priori rational harmony as would be
out

scouted by the

'scientific'

champions of the automaton theory) why

the most noxious acts, such as burning, might not gives thrills of

and the most necessary ones, such as breathing, cause

delight,

agony.''

The

reply

is

that pleasures

and pains of which we are conscious

are only extreme degrees of sensations of the organism which,
usually without our consciousness of them, do guide

toward

it

in its

conduct

And so far from their being sole determiwe are often aware of other impulses so

environment.

its

nants of that conduct,

strong as to decide to action the reverse of pleasant or even quite

though perhaps not disturbing vital processes.
go back to one of the passages from James quoted near
the beginning of this paper, the one where he contrasts "brain
action" and "conscious action." How does he contrive to separate
the latter from the former, with a view to this contrasting? How
painful,

Let

me

can there be conscious action, or better, consciousness of action, that
is not brain action ?

But how about free will? Are we not conscious of a force by
which we exercise choice, by which we resist temptation, by which
we maintain courses of conduct? Surely we choose, resist, persist.
Consciousness does not deceive us.
No, consciousness does not
deceive us.

We

do choose,

resist, persist.

But the we that does

more than what we are conscious of. It is common experience that we wonder how we came to act thus or thus. Which is
so

is

far

simply another expression of the fact that the process that brought
about the action has not emerged into our consciousness. But going

back as far as we can
at the cause

of

it

we

exercise.

why

exercised that
It

any case of

in

we are unable to arrive
when we became conscious

willing,

at the particular instant

power or why we became conscious of the

has become so habitual to us that

ultimate fact. But the least examination would

always something behind
find ourselves speculating

it,

lost in

upon

it,

we

accept

show us

our subconsciousness.

as

if

it

as the

that there

We

is

even

another person had acted, as

:
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in fact is the case

for the

moment

—

e.,

i.

another than the person of

And

conscious.

whom we

this fact constitutes the

are

why

reason

the speculating itself goes on, the section of brain activity to which
it

belongs not having become cognizant of that which produced or

prompted the act of which we were conscious. That act was in
fact due to "cerebral motions of which in themselves we are entirely
without knowledge" James, as above quoted.
It is ancient knowledge that a man may see that a certain course

—

of action

is

best, yet act deliberately

otherwise

Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.

Why? He
come by

is

conscious only of a force too powerful to be over-

the view of the case of which he

each case, any habit

dictates, so far as, in

principle of action that

has involved

its

we know

employment.

is

also conscious.

We

reflection will give the true explanation.

is

A

little

act in general as habit

available.

Any

general

asserts itself only so far as habit

Such habits

as contravene

it

must

be regarded as having been formed before its applicability was
appreciated, or under circumstances that did not strongly call for
exercise; and can be modified, if at all, only by a strong stimulus
from without. Such a stimulus may be the presence of some desirable object or of some danger to be avoided. The stimulus may act
directly upon the habit or mediately through the ideas that closely
underlie it. And the latter is the usual case. We acquire the ways
of a particular social group by living with it and by imitating them.
We might learn them without acquiring them, and that is often the
its

It is plain that doing is essential to the establishment in our
case.
conduct of any principle of action.
As Socrates said, if anybody wishes to appear to be a good fluteA man may be conplayer, he must make himself such in fact.

scious of a wish to do

reasons, the self that
satisfy the wish.

many

is he,

a thing, but

does not

The impulse

may

move

find that, for undefined

in the direction that

would

not to do so has subconsciously gath-

the reasons that inhibit the contemplated action,

and
by the same token has inhibited or nullified all notions contravening
Hence the impotence of casually awakened wishes. They
itself.
float into consciousness and dissolve into oblivion, as evanescent as
the waves with which a light breeze ruffles the surface of a lake,
ered to

itself all

Mr. James discusses the possibility of consciousness helping
"other" and defective "organs," and it is quite conceivable that we
should become conscious of help being rendered to weak organs by

the"i"
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better developed parts of our organism, or, better, of efiforts on the

part of that organism to marshall

its resources for working out its
Such efforts are so much a matter of routine in human
that most of them never come into our consciousness. But

purposes.
actions,

are these "efforts to marshall," etc?

be more or

less

May

ing to the character of the present stimuli,

more or

they not be conceived to

extensive reactions of the cerebral elements accord-

less direct associations

i.

e.,

their strength, their

with previous experiences and the

circumstances that have limited or extended the development of
associations with those experiences

of such brain activities

?

We

know very

well the extent

in the closest relation to the

education or

But again, the possibiliof such reactions must become multiplied in more than geo-

other conditions of
ties

is

life

of the individual.

metric proportion, as the range of experience enlarges, especially

possessed of what

is termed "a lively
must far exceed the
demands of the individual's life, and often, therefore, fail to have
any practical relation with his conduct. For that is more strictly
controlled by habits formed before many of the principles that
might seem proper to control it had found any definite shape in his
mind even subconsciously.
It sums down to this, that the soul of which we are conscious is
to the elements in our consciousness as Kant's Ding an sicli, absolute

if

the individual concerned

imagination."

The

is

resulting combinations

—

matter or substance, so-called,

to the qualities, such as hardness,

is

shape, color, etc., by which alone we are aware of its existence. Self
and matter are simply forms of speech, abstract nouns, to express
collectively the groups of elements constituting the one and the other
so far as

we

are conscious of them.

As, again, James says. Ibid.,

p.

401, "If the passing thought be

the directly verifiable existent which no school has hitherto doubted
it

to be,

then that thought

is

itself

the thinker,

and psychology need

not look beyond."

But I would have psychology look beyond, that is, look to the far
more numerous elements and processes beneath consciousness and
the "passing thought," if it would reach the real thinker that is the
thought. There lies the home of the personality, the domain where
it rules, were it attains to such freedom of will as is possible to it,
and whence it issues its commands to the bodily functions and activThere is the secret labities, as well as to the "stream of thought."
oratory of

life,

of character, of opinion, of

and for our world.

all

we

are for ourselves

